Pearl Harbor: Hawaii Was Surprised; FDR Was Not

Comprehensive research indicates that the U. S. government was aware of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor but chose to conceal this information from commanders in Hawaii. The attack, which occurred on December 7, 1941, resulted in significant damage to the U. S. Pacific Fleet, including the sinking of 18 naval vessels and the death of over 2,000 servicemen. However, U. S. leadership in Washington did not share their knowledge of Japan's plans, believing that the surprise attack would propel the United States into World War II.

British Minister of Production Oliver Lyttleton noted in 1944 that Japan was provoked into attacking America, contradicting claims that the U. S. was forced into the war. President Franklin D. Roosevelt publicly stated that he would not send American troops into foreign wars, while privately planning for direct involvement. In early 1941, Roosevelt's advisor Harry Hopkins conveyed to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that the U. S. would support Britain in the war.

Prior to the attack, Tyler Kent, a code clerk, discovered secret messages between Roosevelt and Churchill revealing plans for U. S. involvement in the war. Kent attempted to inform the American public but was detained. Roosevelt tried to provoke Germany through various means without success, then shifted his focus to Japan, knowing that a conflict with Japan would likely lead to German and Italian declarations of war against the U. S.

Research by Robert B. Stinnett highlights Roosevelt's strategy to provoke Japan, starting from an intelligence memo that detailed actions to incite an attack. Many of these provocations included freezing Japanese assets and imposing trade embargoes. Despite warnings of an impending attack, information was not communicated effectively to commanders in Hawaii, who had no access to intelligence about Japan’s movements.

American intelligence had successfully cracked Japan's secret "Purple" code, which provided insights into Japanese communications. However, this crucial information was not shared with Admiral Kimmel and General Short in Hawaii, leaving them unprepared. Various decoded messages indicated plans for an attack on Pearl Harbor, but these details were withheld from the local commanders.

In November 1941, U. S. intelligence intercepted messages indicating a possible attack, which included explicit orders related to the location of American ships. Despite knowledge of the threat, arrangements were made that further compromised U. S. readiness. On December 1, days before the attack, intelligence indicated Japan would likely resort to military action if diplomatic negotiations failed, and warnings were sent to Washington.

Reports also surfaced from various sources warning of a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, including insights from agents within Japan and the Korean underground. Despite these warnings, efforts to pass on critical information to Roosevelt were often suppressed, as officials believed it was necessary for national defense. Throughout the months leading to December 1941, various international and domestic figures provided credible information of potential attacks, yet responses from U. S. leadership remained insufficient.

The dynamic leading up to Pearl Harbor indicates a complex interplay of provocation and predestined conflict, where potential warnings were either ignored or deliberately withheld, questioning the narrative of a surprise attack and exploring deeper implications regarding U. S. intentions and actions at the time. 

https://thenewamerican.com/us/culture/history/pearl-harbor-hawaii-was-surprised-fdr-was-not/