At issue was this question: Does a federal court have the authority to order disclosure of grand-jury materials if the judge decides that the interests of justice warrant doing so; or is the judge limited to the exceptions to grand-jury secrecy that are spelled out in Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure? The D.C. Circuit's McKeever ruling holds that the text of Rule 6(e) controls.
This is significant for the Mueller report because Rule 6(e) does not contain an exception to secrecy that would permit disclosure to Congress.
In opposition, the Justice Department argued not only that he should be denied the grand-jury records, but also that the lower court had been wrong to claim authority to disclose the materials outside the strictures of Rule 6(e).
The majority explained that the Supreme Court has long recognized the vital purposes served by grand-jury secrecy, and thus that secrecy must be protected unless there is some clear contrary indication in a statute or rule.
Those who contend that a court may permit disclosure outside the rule argue that judges had such authority before the rule was enacted.
The panel majority emphasized the rule's sweeping language: Officials must refrain from disclosure "Unless these rules provide otherwise." The rule also takes pains to spell out the situations in which a judge may authorize disclosure.
Judges Ginsburg and Katsas disagreed, relating that the lower and appellate courts in Haldeman failed to conduct any "Meaningful analysis of Rule 6(e)'s terms"; they merely offered policy arguments in favor of disclosure - with Sirica, for example, suggesting that disclosure to the House of Representatives was analogous to disclosure to another grand jury.
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/04/mueller-report-attorney-general-grand-jury-information/
This is significant for the Mueller report because Rule 6(e) does not contain an exception to secrecy that would permit disclosure to Congress.
In opposition, the Justice Department argued not only that he should be denied the grand-jury records, but also that the lower court had been wrong to claim authority to disclose the materials outside the strictures of Rule 6(e).
The majority explained that the Supreme Court has long recognized the vital purposes served by grand-jury secrecy, and thus that secrecy must be protected unless there is some clear contrary indication in a statute or rule.
Those who contend that a court may permit disclosure outside the rule argue that judges had such authority before the rule was enacted.
The panel majority emphasized the rule's sweeping language: Officials must refrain from disclosure "Unless these rules provide otherwise." The rule also takes pains to spell out the situations in which a judge may authorize disclosure.
Judges Ginsburg and Katsas disagreed, relating that the lower and appellate courts in Haldeman failed to conduct any "Meaningful analysis of Rule 6(e)'s terms"; they merely offered policy arguments in favor of disclosure - with Sirica, for example, suggesting that disclosure to the House of Representatives was analogous to disclosure to another grand jury.
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/04/mueller-report-attorney-general-grand-jury-information/
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