The world is on the very brink of a major trade war between the US and China, and it is unlikely to end quickly.
The protectionists at the heart of the administration - in particular Robert Lighthizer, the US trade representative, and Peter Navarro, policy adviser on trade and manufacturing in the White House - have long regarded China as the core of America's trade problems.
The kinds of changes that the US wants to see in Beijing's "Made in China 2025" programme would require profound changes in the relationship between the Chinese state and industry that have political, as well as economic, implications.
The contest over future technologies also underlines the fact that there is a strategic aspect to this trade rivalry - something that is completely lacking in the Trump administration's confrontations with Mexico, Canada or even the EU. China is the only plausible rival to the US as the dominant power of the 21st century.
So while Mr Trump's trade tariffs reflect his own personal quirks - in particular, his longstanding protectionism - they are also part of a broader mood-shift within the US. Large parts of the US establishment, well beyond the Trump administration, have soured on the idea that economic engagement is the best way to deal with a rising China.
Prominent Democrats are now as vocal in their calls for tariffs and trade sanctions on China as Mr Trump.
The Americans think that because China enjoys a massive trade surplus with the US, it is bound to suffer most and blink first.
https://www.ft.com/content/26b1ee96-b4d1-11e8-b3ef-799c8613f4a1
The protectionists at the heart of the administration - in particular Robert Lighthizer, the US trade representative, and Peter Navarro, policy adviser on trade and manufacturing in the White House - have long regarded China as the core of America's trade problems.
The kinds of changes that the US wants to see in Beijing's "Made in China 2025" programme would require profound changes in the relationship between the Chinese state and industry that have political, as well as economic, implications.
The contest over future technologies also underlines the fact that there is a strategic aspect to this trade rivalry - something that is completely lacking in the Trump administration's confrontations with Mexico, Canada or even the EU. China is the only plausible rival to the US as the dominant power of the 21st century.
So while Mr Trump's trade tariffs reflect his own personal quirks - in particular, his longstanding protectionism - they are also part of a broader mood-shift within the US. Large parts of the US establishment, well beyond the Trump administration, have soured on the idea that economic engagement is the best way to deal with a rising China.
Prominent Democrats are now as vocal in their calls for tariffs and trade sanctions on China as Mr Trump.
The Americans think that because China enjoys a massive trade surplus with the US, it is bound to suffer most and blink first.
https://www.ft.com/content/26b1ee96-b4d1-11e8-b3ef-799c8613f4a1
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