There were three plausible positions: the power to remove was coincident with the power to appoint, and thereby required advice and consent of the Senate; Congress had the power to confer a unitary removal power at its discretion; or the president had such a power by virtue of the Constitution itself.
In favor of the president's constitutional power.
First, the executive power is "Vested" in the president of the United States, except where it was specifically qualified - for example, by the requirement for advice and consent for treaties and appointments.
Because the power to superintend, control, and remove officers was an executive power not otherwise qualified by the Constitution, it belonged to the president alone.
"If the duty to see the laws faithfully executed be required at the hands of the Executive Magistrate, it would seem that it was generally intended he should have that species of power which is necessary to accomplish that end." Indeed, how can the president ensure that the laws be faithfully executed if he has no ability to remove officers he believes is acting inconsistently with what a faithful execution of the law requires?
These arguments persuaded the other representatives, who voted to delete language in the bill that appeared to confer the removal power at Congress's discretion, in favor of the following provision: "Whenever the said principal officer() shall be removed by the President." The implication, the author of the amendment explained.
Others challenges have claimed that prosecution was not always conducted by the "Executive," implying either that prosecution was not an executive function, the president's power was not unitary over executive functions, or both.
http://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/385506-on-presidents-v-special-counsels-justice-scalia-got-it-right-long-ago
In favor of the president's constitutional power.
First, the executive power is "Vested" in the president of the United States, except where it was specifically qualified - for example, by the requirement for advice and consent for treaties and appointments.
Because the power to superintend, control, and remove officers was an executive power not otherwise qualified by the Constitution, it belonged to the president alone.
"If the duty to see the laws faithfully executed be required at the hands of the Executive Magistrate, it would seem that it was generally intended he should have that species of power which is necessary to accomplish that end." Indeed, how can the president ensure that the laws be faithfully executed if he has no ability to remove officers he believes is acting inconsistently with what a faithful execution of the law requires?
These arguments persuaded the other representatives, who voted to delete language in the bill that appeared to confer the removal power at Congress's discretion, in favor of the following provision: "Whenever the said principal officer() shall be removed by the President." The implication, the author of the amendment explained.
Others challenges have claimed that prosecution was not always conducted by the "Executive," implying either that prosecution was not an executive function, the president's power was not unitary over executive functions, or both.
http://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/385506-on-presidents-v-special-counsels-justice-scalia-got-it-right-long-ago
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