Advice pours into the White House and the Pentagon daily on how
to avoid a broad commitment in the Syrian civil war. At the same
time this advice generally aims at arming select rebel groups that
are not connected with other rebels who are part of the large al
Qaeda-linked complex now also fighting the Assad regime. An overly
simple answer to a complex problem.
Aiding an insurgency that has multiple leaderships and different motivations is more the norm than it might appear. Even groups of insurgents that seek to project an image of unity of purpose often undermine their own combat effectiveness because of varying ambitions of future territorial as well as economic and/or political control. The Taliban in Afghanistan have had just that characteristic — first against the Soviets and then against the U.S. international alliance. Family, clan and tribal ties separate the numerous groupings, to say nothing of the vigorous rivalry among insurgent leaders themselves. This is clearly true also in Syria.
http://spectator.org/archives/2013/09/04/roads-to-damascus
Aiding an insurgency that has multiple leaderships and different motivations is more the norm than it might appear. Even groups of insurgents that seek to project an image of unity of purpose often undermine their own combat effectiveness because of varying ambitions of future territorial as well as economic and/or political control. The Taliban in Afghanistan have had just that characteristic — first against the Soviets and then against the U.S. international alliance. Family, clan and tribal ties separate the numerous groupings, to say nothing of the vigorous rivalry among insurgent leaders themselves. This is clearly true also in Syria.
http://spectator.org/archives/2013/09/04/roads-to-damascus
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