US security does not require nearly 1,600 nuclear weapons deployed on
a triad of systems—bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—to
deliver them. A smaller arsenal deployed entirely on submarines would
save roughly $20 billion annually while deterring attacks on the United
States and its allies. A missile dyad is more politically feasible but
saves less.
The triad grew from the military services’ competition to meet the Soviet threat. The arguments for it arrived to rationalize its components. The public rationale was a second strike: a diversity of delivery systems insured the nuclear arsenal’s survival against a Soviet preemptive attack. The more sophisticated rationale was a first strike: deterring Soviet aggression against European allies required the ability to preemptively destroy their nuclear forces.
http://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/end-overkill-reassessing-us-nuclear-weapons-policy
The triad grew from the military services’ competition to meet the Soviet threat. The arguments for it arrived to rationalize its components. The public rationale was a second strike: a diversity of delivery systems insured the nuclear arsenal’s survival against a Soviet preemptive attack. The more sophisticated rationale was a first strike: deterring Soviet aggression against European allies required the ability to preemptively destroy their nuclear forces.
http://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/end-overkill-reassessing-us-nuclear-weapons-policy
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