Leak Of Crossfire Hurricane Agent’s Identity To The NYT Suggests More To Come

1. The IG report explained that Somma had tasked Halper with asking Clovis about “Papadopoulos and Carter Page ‘because they were … unknowns’ and the Crossfire Hurricane team was trying to find out how ‘these two individuals who are not known in political circles … [got] introduced to the campaign,’ including whether the person responsible for those introductions had ties to Russian Intelligence Services (RIS).” But as I reported in my article on the extensive spying aimed at the Trump campaign, “when Halper spoke with Clovis on September 1, 2016, in a recorded conversation, Halper posed several questions about sensitive campaign strategies.” For example, Halper asked Clovis “whether the Trump campaign was planning an ‘October Surprise,’” and learned the Trump campaign planned to focus on “giv[ing] people a reason to vote for him, not just vote against Hillary.” Clovis also shared with Halper that Trump did not want to “do a traditional campaign,” and added “additional comments about the internal structure, organization, and functioning of the Trump campaign.” Halper’s recorded conversation with Clovis delved even deeper into campaign concerns, with Halper discussing with Clovis “an internal campaign debate about Trump’s immigration strategy, efforts to reach out to minority groups and the impact of those efforts, and the campaign’s strategies for responding to questions about Trump’s decision not to release his tax returns.” The IG report did not detail the content of these conversations, but here, an earlier comment Halper made to Page proves significant: Prior to meeting with Clovis, Halper told Page that he was available whenever Clovis “wants to chat,” then Halper added that he “would like to meet with [Clovis],” because there are “some things that have to be done at this part of … the campaign….
2. On the other hand, evidence continues to mount suggesting that Halper started spying on Flynn even before his “chance” meeting with Page in mid-July 2016, re-upping questions about Halper’s interest in Flynn and what Somma may have known about their “acquaintance.” Somma seemed to deny any special knowledge about Halper’s connections, however, telling “the OIG that ‘quite honestly … we kind of stumbled upon [Halper] knowing these folks.’” It was “serendipitous” Somma said, that Halper “had contacts with three of their four subjects, including Carter Page.” And “the Crossfire Hurricane team ‘couldn’t believe [their] luck.’” The IG report, however, never reconciled this reaction with Somma’s earlier statements that he believed Halper “may have met, one or more of the Crossfire Hurricane subjects.” Who’s Handling Who? The other possibility is that Somma wasn’t handling Halper, but that Halper was handling Somma.
3. Why, then, “was the first potential use of FISA authority considered by the Crossfire Hurricane team” focused on Page and not on Papadopoulos—the individual who supposedly received the tip from Joseph Mifsud? Somma claimed his concern was obtaining “valuable information about what Page did while in Moscow the previous month and the Russian officials with whom he may have spoken.” But again, why Page and not Papadopoulos as the first focus? We don’t have an answer, but we do know that the Office of General Counsel concluded the FBI did not have enough evidence to obtain a FISA surveillance order until the next month, when the Crossfire Hurricane team received reporting from Christopher Steele “concerning Page’s alleged activities with Russian officials in the summer of 2016.” According to the IG report, “That ‘pushed it over’ the line in terms of establishing probable cause that Page was acting in concert with Russian officials.” Did Somma Know of Steele’s Reporting? But now that we know Somma’s identity, there’s a surrealness to this entire scene.
4. Beyond pushing for the FISA surveillance to start immediately, Somma bore responsibility for many of the substantial omissions and misstatements in the FISA warrant, as the IG report detailed: As noted throughout this report, Case Agent 1 was primarily responsible for some of the most significant errors and omissions in the FISA applications, including (1) the mischaracterization of Steele’s prior reporting resulting from his failure to seek review and approval of the statement from the handling agent, as the Woods Procedures required, (2) the failure to advise 01 of Papadopoulos’s statements to FBI CHSs that were inconsistent with the Steele reporting relied upon in the FISA applications that there was a “well-developed conspiracy of cooperation” between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and Russia, (3) the failure to advise 01 of Page’s statements to an FBI CHS regarding him having no communications with Manafort and denying the alleged meetings with Sechin and Divyekin, ( 4) providing inaccurate and incomplete information to 01 about information provided by another U.S. government agency regarding its past relationship with Page that was highly relevant to the applications, (5) the failure to advise 01 of the information from Bruce Ohr about Steele and his election reporting, and (6) the failure to advise 01 of the inconsistences between Steele and his Primary Sub-source.

https://thefederalist.com/2020/03/02/leak-of-crossfire-hurricane-agents-identity-to-the-nyt-suggests-more-to-come/