The epistemic standard in question is the belief, or more precisely the assumption, universally shared by Trump's opponents, that it's unreasonable to believe that the 2020 election was stolen.
Note well: it's not counterintuitive to think that the election was not stolen.
What's counterintuitive is to think that it's unreasonable to believe the election was stolen.
You have to first think about the matter, in light of the observable facts, to decide what it is rationally intuitive or counterintuitive to believe about the 2020 election.
Abbreviating the statement "It's unreasonable to believe that the election was not stolen" as unreasonable-to-believe-not-stolen, ask yourself whether it's counterintuitive.
Unreasonable-to-believe-not-stolen is undoubtedly as question-begging as unreasonable-to-believe-stolen, but is it just as counterintuitive? The answer is that if the pro-Trump unreasonableness standard is counterintuitive at all, it is surely less counterintuitive than the anti-Trump unreasonableness standard.
In the 2020 election debate, and notably unlike in the abortion debate, counterintuitive thinking is asymmetrical.
https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2023/09/the_2020_election_plot_thickens.html
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