In short, Section 702 authorizes the government to obtain annual, programmatic court orders from the FISA Court to target foreigners overseas for foreign intelligence surveillance.
While terrorism is the most frequently mentioned intelligence purpose for 702 wiretapping, it can also be used to collect information related to espionage, foreign governments and their employees, and the catch-all categories of national defense and foreign affairs.
The rules governing target selection and how the resulting information is used are reviewed and approved by the FISA Court every year, although there is very little publicly available information about how this works as a practical matter.
We've made extensive recommendations about how the statute could have been amended to better focus surveillance on bad actors and protect the information of innocent people caught up in the program.
Prior to enactment of S. 139, nothing in FISA Section 702 made any reference at all to "About" collection, and the practice remained secret until disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013.
This small change is not expected to change the way the FBI treats Americans' information in any meaningful way.
It is a far cry from the reform that CDT and others sought to close the backdoor search loophole, which will continue to permit the government to query Section 702 data for information about Americans, even though they cannot be targets of Section 702 surveillance.
First, Section 111 requires the Attorney General to brief the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees on whether and how the Department of Justice notifies people that 702 information and other information collected under FISA authorities is used against them in official proceedings.
Because the government has refused to explain how information derived from 702 surveillance is used to build cases, or is used to collect the same or similar information through other surveillance authorities, and therefore obscure the source of the information, this briefing is crucial.
Second, Section 112 requires the Justice Department Inspector General to audit the process by which the FBI queries US person information and uses it.
It covers several topics, but invites the government to explain how encryption is thwarting intelligence collection, whether difficulty in determining the location of targets or their data is a problem, and current or expected problems with getting information from telecommunication and other companies on a voluntary or compulsory basis.
https://cdt.org/blog/fisa-702-what-happened-and-whats-next/
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/115-2018/s12
While terrorism is the most frequently mentioned intelligence purpose for 702 wiretapping, it can also be used to collect information related to espionage, foreign governments and their employees, and the catch-all categories of national defense and foreign affairs.
The rules governing target selection and how the resulting information is used are reviewed and approved by the FISA Court every year, although there is very little publicly available information about how this works as a practical matter.
We've made extensive recommendations about how the statute could have been amended to better focus surveillance on bad actors and protect the information of innocent people caught up in the program.
Prior to enactment of S. 139, nothing in FISA Section 702 made any reference at all to "About" collection, and the practice remained secret until disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013.
This small change is not expected to change the way the FBI treats Americans' information in any meaningful way.
It is a far cry from the reform that CDT and others sought to close the backdoor search loophole, which will continue to permit the government to query Section 702 data for information about Americans, even though they cannot be targets of Section 702 surveillance.
First, Section 111 requires the Attorney General to brief the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees on whether and how the Department of Justice notifies people that 702 information and other information collected under FISA authorities is used against them in official proceedings.
Because the government has refused to explain how information derived from 702 surveillance is used to build cases, or is used to collect the same or similar information through other surveillance authorities, and therefore obscure the source of the information, this briefing is crucial.
Second, Section 112 requires the Justice Department Inspector General to audit the process by which the FBI queries US person information and uses it.
It covers several topics, but invites the government to explain how encryption is thwarting intelligence collection, whether difficulty in determining the location of targets or their data is a problem, and current or expected problems with getting information from telecommunication and other companies on a voluntary or compulsory basis.
https://cdt.org/blog/fisa-702-what-happened-and-whats-next/
FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017
This was a vote to pass S. 139 in the Senate.
This bill became the vehicle for passage of the FISA
Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017. The bill would extend so-called
"section 702" government surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.
The bill was originally introduced and passed the Senate in 2017 as the Rapid DNA Act, a bill to expand the use of DNA in law enforcement. In August 2017, its identical companion bill H.R. 510 was enacted in its place. On January 11, 2018, the House replaced the text of this bill, which had become moot by the enactment of an identical bill, with the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act, which was originally introduced as S. 2010.
The bill was originally introduced and passed the Senate in 2017 as the Rapid DNA Act, a bill to expand the use of DNA in law enforcement. In August 2017, its identical companion bill H.R. 510 was enacted in its place. On January 11, 2018, the House replaced the text of this bill, which had become moot by the enactment of an identical bill, with the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act, which was originally introduced as S. 2010.
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/115-2018/s12
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